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The Revision of the Constitution in
the PRC
A great leap forward or a symbolic gesture?
Chen Jianfu
1 At the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress (March 5th-14th
2004),  the  Constitution  of  the  PRC  underwent  yet  another  revision1.  As  usual,  the
revision  of  the  Constitution  is  praised  by  the  Chinese  media  and  deputies  to  the
Congress as “having deep and far reaching significance”, etc.2. This periodical revision
of the Constitution—four times (1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004) since its adoption in 19823—
makes the Chinese Constitution one of the most frequently revised, if  not the most
frequently  revised,  constitutions  in  the  world.  This  is  however  not  to  say  that  the
revision is merely a political exercise. Seen as the “mother of all laws”4 in China, the
Chinese Constitution sets parameters for legal developments, and any breakthrough in
the  setting  of  such  parameters  will  be  significant  for  the  development  of
constitutionalism.  This  paper  examines  the most  recent  constitutional  amendments
adopted on March 14th 2004 by  the  National  People’s  Congress  (NPC)5,  which took
effect  on  the  same day.  In  order  to  give  a  full  picture,  a  brief  review of  previous
revisions is provided. It is argued that, while the present constitutional amendment
will  have little immediate impact on society or the economy, it  offers potential  for
future legal development and human rights protection. Further,  if  the amendments
adopted in 1988, 1993 and 1999 reflect the continuing conceptual evolution of socialism
in China and the 1999 amendments evidence a consensus among the Communist Party
of China (CPC) leadership on the nature of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as
well  as  providing  further  legal  protection  to  “capitalist”  economic  practices6,  the
present revision indicates a certain distinct confidence of the Chinese leadership in
pursuing its own version of socialism. It is however also argued that, as it was with the
1999 revision, more important and fundamental problems in the present Constitution
are yet to be addressed, hopefully in the not too distant future.
The development of the 1982 Constitution
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2 The 1982 Constitution is essentially a Dengist constitution, reflecting Deng Xiaoping’s
ideas for modernising China, i.e., social stability, economic development and opening to
the outside. It is also a result of the constant, and sometimes painful, search for China’s
own version of socialism7. It made its tentative move towards liberalisation, politically
and economically, while insisting on firm control by the Party. Thus, the Preamble both
upholds the so-called “Four Fundamental Principles”8 and emphasises the construction
of socialist modernisation as a fundamental national task. Article 18 of the Constitution
formally provides a constitutional basis for foreign investment and its protection in
China.  Article  11  of  the  Constitution  allows  the  development,  within  the  limits
prescribed by law, of an individual economy as a complement to the socialist economy.
Article 10, for the first time in the PRC’s constitution, defines the ownership of land in
China.  Although  hailed  as  “the  best  since  the  founding  of  the  PRC”9,  the  1982
Constitution was soon amended, in April 1988, to legitimise the existence of the rapidly
developing  private  economy  as  well  as  to  provide  a  constitutional  basis  for  the
commercial transfer of land use rights,  both of which were the results of economic
reform and prerequisites for further economic development.
3 Further ideologically significant revision was necessitated by the adoption by the Party
at its Fourteenth Congress of the notion of a “socialist market economy” in 1992. So not
long after the Central Committee of the CPC formally submitted its “Suggestions on
Amending  Certain  Contents  of  the  Constitution”  the  NPC  dutifully  adopted  the
suggestions and translated the new Party policy into law in March 199310. As a result of
the  revision,  the  term  “socialist  market  economy”  then  replaced  that  of  “planned
economy”.  The  terms  “state-run  (guoying)  economy”  and  “state-run  enterprises”
replaced  by  “state-owned  (guoyou)  economy”  and  “state-owned  enterprises”
respectively. Similarly, provisions on state planning were removed and in their place
were  put  provisions  that  require  the  state  to  strengthen  economic  legislation  and
macro-economic control. On the whole, the 1993 amendment provides flexibility,
though not specific direction, for future development. The Fifteenth Party Congress in
1997 laid down certain political foundations for post-Deng China11,  which adopted a
policy  to  continue  the  reform  policy  launched  by  Deng  Xiaoping  in  1979  and  to
incorporate a Dengist version of socialism into the constitution12.Once again, efforts
took  place  to  transform  the  Party  policy  into  constitutional  provisions  through
constitutional revision. The revision was undertaken by a Revision Group of the Central
Committee of the Party, headed by Li Peng. Since its first draft, issued on December 5th
1998 for internal Party discussion, the drafting work went swiftly.  By January 22nd
1999, a formal proposal had already been made by the Party to the Standing Committee
for consideration and adoption13.  The formal adoption at the Second Session of  the
Ninth  NPC  was  a  formality;  the  proposal  was  adopted  word  for  word14.The  six
amendments in 1999 fall  into three categories: further supplementation to the Four
Fundamental  Principles,  a  Chinese  version  of  the  “Rule  of  Law”,  and  a  politico-
economic version of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”15. On the whole, the 1999
revision of the Constitution was essentially designed to carry out the conversion of the
adopted ideology of the Fifteenth Party Congress of 1997 into the form of fundamental
state law, that is, to convert the will of the Party into that of the state. The revision
reflects  the  Party’s  determination  to  continue  the  reforms  and  opening-up and  to
administer the country according to law. Examined from a development perspective,
such revision indicates the then understanding of the notion of socialism with Chinese
characteristics among the Party leadership.
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4 The First Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Party Congress (2002) began the change-over
of  Party  leadership,  which  continued  until  the  First  Plenary  Session  of  the  Tenth
National  People’s  Congress  in  2003.  These  congresses  saw  the  partial  handover  of
leadership power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao16. So, the Sixteenth Party Congress was
to sum up the Party’s experience (or to record its achievements) in the previous five
years and to set out a policy direction for the new leadership. Not surprisingly, the
policy  “spirit”  as  adopted  by  the  Sixteenth  Party  Congress  would  need  to  be
incorporated into the Constitution;  hence a new round of constitutional revision.As
early as on March 27th 2003, a Constitutional Revision Group, headed by Wu Bangguo
(the  new  Chairman  of  the  Standing  Committee  of  the  NPC)  and  under  the  direct
leadership of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Party, was established. At
the same time,  the  principles  for  the  revision were  also  set  down by the Standing
Committee of the Politburo17. Official consultation was swiftly conducted in the next
several months within limited circles of authorities and personnel, such as of provincial
leaders,  leaders  of  the democratic  parties,  and selected groups of  local  leaders and
prominent  scholars18. The  draft  Suggestion  on  Amending  Certain  Contents  of  the
Constitution was soon taking shape by August 2003. It is at this time that the on-going
revision was first officially reported19. It should be pointed out that even though this
was the first formal announcement of the on-going revision of the Constitution, there
was no mention of such a Group, even though it was said that the plenary session would
discuss  the  proposals  for  constitutional  reform20.  As  was  the  previous  practice,  the
recommendations were dutifully and faithfully adopted by the NPC, making itself once
again a rubber stamp of the Party. Sadly, this practice is patently undemocratic: If the
people have no right to participate in such fundamentally important political matters,
it is perhaps unrealistic, if not insulting, to tell the people that they enjoy democracy
and the rule of law.Even though the on-going revision was not officially reported until
August  2003,  the  Chinese  media  began  to  break  the  news  unofficially  around June
200321. It was clear that Chinese scholars were consulted at a rather early stage, and
certainly no later than June 2003. Not surprisingly, academics began to express a wide
range of views and opinions, suggesting far reaching revisions to the Constitution22,
and  academic  symposiums  devoted  to  the  revision  were  also  organised,  the  most
notable convened in Qingdao City23, and in Shanghai24, both in June 2003 and both of
which were attended by prominent scholars consulted by the Politburo on the revision,
such as Professors Jiang Ping and Wu Jinlian. However, enthusiasm among academics
was quickly dampened. A secret instruction was soon issued by the Party to stop all
conferences and publication of academic papers on constitutional reform, and leading
economists and legal scholars actively involved in presenting their views were reported
to have been harassed by the security forces25. Thus, contrary to the assertion by the
Chinese  authorities  that  the  revision  of the  constitution  was  carried  out  on  a
democratic basis with wide consultation26, consultation was only conducted within the
strictly limited circles of the authorities and the elite. 
5 Nevertheless,  the  drafting  went  swiftly.  By  mid-October  2003,  the  Suggestions  on
Amending Certain Contents of the Constitution had been adopted by the Third Session
of the Central Committee of the Sixteenth Party Congress, which also decided to pass
the  Suggestions  to  the  Standing  Committee  of  the  NPC  to  be  converted  into  a
constitutional  amendment bill  in accordance with the constitutional  procedures.  As
usual, the Standing Committee of the NPC dutifully did so at its Sixth Meeting of the
Tenth NPC held during December 22nd-27th 2003. Also on December 22nd 2003, the
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Suggestions on Amending Certain Contents of the Constitution were, for the first time,
published  in  full  in  the  Chinese  media.  Theoretically,  the  Amendment  Bill  finally
adopted by the full NPC on March 14th 2004 was no longer a Party document, but a
formal legislative bill, except that the Bill was a verbatim copy of the Suggestions. As
such, the revision started in late March 2003 and completed in mid-October of the same
year was another world record.
Major revisions
6 Similar  to  the 1999 revision,  the present  revision is  designed to  incorporate  policy
decisions made at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, including the adoption of the
“Three  Represents”  idea,  along  with  the  “Four  Fundamental  Principles”  and  Deng
Xiaoping’s Theory, as guiding principles of the Party. It is meant to be a partial, not
comprehensive, revision27. It was expressly decided that only the matters that must be
regulated by the Constitution and only the provisions that must be revised immediately
would  be  dealt  with  by  the  revision.  Other  matters,  though  desirable  for  revision,
would be clarified later by constitutional interpretations, rather than by the present
revision. In other words, the present revision is little more than an implementation of
the  Party  policies  as  adopted  at  the  Sixteenth  Party  Congress  in  2002.The  various
amendments fall into five categories: the adoption of a new guiding principle for the
Constitution, an explicit recognition of human rights,  further protection for private
property, a more civilian-type approach to a state of emergency, and some technical
revisions. 
A personal stamp?
7 The  Chinese  Constitution,  like  many  others,  is  ideology-ridden,  but  none  is  more
heavily  so  than  its  Preamble.  What  makes  the  Chinese  Constitution  stand  out  so
strikingly  is  the  constantly  changing  perception  of  socialism  and  of  the  guiding
principles  for  building  socialism  with  Chinese  characteristics.  Thus,  when  Deng
Xiaoping came to power, he managed to repudiate the radical ideas preached during
the Cultural Revolution, but retained the status of secular god of Mao Zedong. He thus
incorporated  the  Four  Fundamental  Principles  into  the  Constitution.  When  Deng
Xiaoping handed power to Jiang Zemin, the latter soon elevated Deng’s idea of building
socialism and modernising China into a constitutional guiding principle in the name of
Deng Xiaoping Theory28. Now Jiang is retiring he wants to put a personal stamp on the
Constitution too.  In the last  few years he has been busy promoting his awkwardly-
worded  “Three  Represents”  as  “new  thinking”.  As  such,  that  each  constitutional
revision coincides with the five-year term of the Party Congress and the NPC reflects in
effect  the  changes  in  Party  leadership.  Jiang  Zemin  began  to  talk  about  the  “new
thinking” of the Three Represents in February 2000 in a piecemeal fashion29. However,
from 2000 through to the end of 2002, he managed to wage a major political campaign,
but  most  importantly,  he  managed  to  have  the  Party  Constitution  changed  at  the
Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002.  At this Congress,  the phrase “Ruling the Country
According to Law” was added to the Party Constitution30. To this effect, paragraph 12 of
the Preamble of the revised Party Constitution now states: “The Communist Party of
China leads the people in promoting socialist democracy and building socialist political
civilisation.  It  keeps  expanding  socialist  democracy,  strengthens  the  socialist  legal
system, rules the country according to law, builds a socialist country ruled according to
law, and consolidates the people’s democratic dictatorship”31.The same revision of the
Party Constitution also declares that “[t]he Communist Party of China leads the people
in their efforts to build a spiritual as well as a material and political civilisation and to
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combine ruling the country according to law with ruling the country by virtue”32. In
addition to upholding the Four Fundamental Principles and Deng Xiaoping Theory33,
the revision also adds Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents as important “Thought” which
shall guide the actions of the Party34. The Three Represents means, according to the
revised Party Constitution, that the Party represents the development trend of China’s
advanced  productive  forces,  the  orientation  of  China’s  advanced  culture  and  the
fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. In other
words, the Party represents what are perceived by the Party as the “advanced” forces
of society at a given time. The political rationale for this “new thinking” is then clear,
that  is, as  an  embodiment  of  the  “advanced”  forces,  the  Party  could  continue  to
maintain control of, legitimacy in, and relevance to the society. This having been done,
it is not surprising that the first amendment for the new revision is to incorporate the
changes  in  the  Party  Constitution  into  the  State  Constitution.  Thus,  the  amended
Constitution (para. 7 of the Preamble) now “enshrines” into the State Constitution the
“important thinking of the Three Represents” as a national guiding ideology. At the
same time,  “promoting the co-ordinated development of  a materialist,  political  and
spiritual civilisation” is also added to paragraph 7 of the Preamble. The latter signals
that the newly enshrined “Ruling the Country According to Law” will now formally be
supplemented by “ruling the country by virtue”, a phrase which attempts to re-enforce
the role of the Party leadership as the bearer of correct ideology as well as combining
law and morality in ruling the country. However, one must not read too much into
these frequent changes/additions of political phrases, otherwise we may well fall into
the trap of what a prominent Chinese legal scholar has termed “the tendency of ruling
the country by slogans”35.
8 And awkward as it might be in its wording, the Three Represents as “new thinking” is
not completely devoid of practical implications36. Indeed, that the Party must represent
the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces is nothing more than an
ideologically coated phrase to say that capitalism is not inherently contradictory to
communism. It is under this “new thinking” that the Party invites “capitalists” to join
the Party, thus effectively telling the Chinese people that the Party does not only want
capitalists as a new force (builders in the cause of socialist construction) in the United
Front37, but also as a part of the Party. That is to say, “getting rich is not only glorious
(being in the United Front) but also prestigious (being part of the Party)”. Further, the
added protection for private property may also be seen as a consequence of this “new
thinking”.
9 There is also a quiet change of wording in the Preamble of the Constitution in relation
to the description of China as a socialist country. In the 1993 constitutional revision the
following  phrase  was  added to the  Preamble,  which  reads  “[o]ur  country  is  in  the
primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation is to concentrate its efforts on
socialist  modernisation  in  accordance  with  the  theory  of  building  socialism  with
Chinese  characteristics.”  That  was  an  ingenious  invention  to  justify  “capitalist”
practices  in  a  socialist  country38.  In  the  1999  constitutional  revision,  these  two
sentences were further changed to “[o]ur country will over a long period of time be in
the primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation is to concentrate its efforts
on  socialist  modernisation  in  pursuing  the  construction  of  socialism  with  Chinese
characteristics.” This then was to signal to the world that capitalism will be tolerated
on a long-term basis and to declare that building socialism with Chinese characteristics
was no longer a theory but a practice as well. The quiet change in the present revision
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from  “in  pursuing  the  construction  of  socialism  with  Chinese  characteristics”  into
“along  the  road  of  Chinese-style  socialism”  thus  indicates  the  confidence  of  the
leadership that the Party and the state are no longer hesitating in their search for an
original Chinese version of socialism39.
Towards an Age of Rights?
10 Perhaps  the  most  important  and  striking  revision  is  the  declaration,  without  any
qualification  and  without  much  debate  and  controversy  as  in  the  case  of  private
property, that “[T]he state respects and protects human rights”40.
11 The term “human rights” has a rather bumpy history in the PRC. Although there have
been many lively debates on issues commonly understood as human rights, the term
was  rarely  applied  as  official  language;  instead,  all  Chinese  constitutions  have
consistently used the term “citizen’s rights”, which implicitly rejects the universality of
human rights  and implied  the  class  nature of  such rights;  that  is,  citizens  may be
differentiated according to their class backgrounds. It may also imply the exclusion of
foreigners and stateless persons in China41.  Ironically, the term “human rights” was
only officially used after the June 4th Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, in particular
after the State Council issued its white paper, Human Rights in China, in 199142.
12 This declaration can have some significant practical implications. First, this unqualified
declaration perhaps means that China has now finally come to accept universal human
rights, rather than insisting on an “Asian” or “Chinese” conception of human rights.
Secondly, also as a consequence of this unqualified declaration, the scope of human
rights could be interpreted to include not only the fundamental rights as codified in
Chapter  Two  of  the  Constitution  but  also  those  contained  in,  at  least,  the  two
International Covenants that China has signed43, such as the right to strike which was
abolished during the making of the 1982 Constitution44. Thirdly, the insertion of this
declaration  in  Article  33  bears  some  significant  practical  implications.  Article  33
defines the nature of rights in China: that is, all citizens are equal before the law and
citizens,  while  enjoying  rights,  must  also  perform  the  duties  as  prescribed  by  the
Constitution and the law, the so-called “unity of rights and duties”.
13 The use of the term “citizen’s rights” instead of “human rights” is not without practical
significance. Here, the provisions of Article 33 are not without some major problems:
equality before the law apparently refers to equality in implementing laws, not in law-
making45, and would only be enjoyed by citizens of the PRC46. The declaration on the
respect  for  and  protection  of  human  rights  could  potentially  allow  the  court  to
interpret “all citizens are equal before the law” to mean “all people are equal before the
law”; otherwise the provisions in Article 33 would be inherently inconsistent. Finally,
with calls from academics and officials to pay attention to the actual implementation of
the Constitution47, Chinese courts can and should take protection of human rights as a
major consideration in its adjudications, at least when the relevant Chinese law is not
clear or is ambiguous on particular matters. Certainly we are not seeing the coming of
age of  rights in China as yet,  as  the various international  human rights reports on
China testify. However, this declaration may, as Xu Xianming, a jurist and a deputy to
the NPC has rightly pointed out, ultimately bring about changes to the state’s value
system48.
A bold approach to a fundamental ideological dilemma?
14 A central tenet of socialism is its insistence on public ownership and, thus there are
serious  difficulties  in  dealing  with  private  property  in  a  socialist  constitution.  An
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important attempt is made in the current revision to once again address the question
of  private  property  in  the  constitution,  thus  strengthening  the  constitutional
protection of private property.
15 Initially, Article 11 of the 1982 Constitution defines the individual economy of urban
and rural working people as a complement to the socialist public economy, and the
lawful rights and interests of the individual economy are protected by the state. Article
13 protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and
other  lawful  property,  as  well  as  the  right  to  inherit  private  property.  Here,  the
individual economy of urban and rural working people refers to the economy in the
form  of  Individual  Industrial  and  Commercial  Households  and Rural  Contracting
Households  (the  so-called  “Two Households”)49.  This  was  the  only  private  economy
allowed  by  the  Chinese  law  at  the  time.  The  post-Mao  economic  reforms  saw  the
emergence of private enterprise, defined as “a privately funded economic entity which
employs at least eight persons”50. Article 11 of the Constitution was then amended in
1988  to  “permit  the  private  economy  to  exist  and  to  develop  within  the  limits
prescribed by  law” and defines  such an economy as  a  complement  to  the  socialist
public  economy.  Here,  the  private  economy  refers  to  the  economy  in  the  form  of
private enterprises as defined by law.
16 The rapid development of the private economy51, again necessitated further elevation
of the role of the non-public economy. Through the 1999 constitutional revision the
individual  and  private  economies  were  no  longer  defined  as  a  complement  to  the
socialist  public  economy;  they  were  treated  as  “an  important  component  of  the
country’s  socialist  market  economy”52.  Further,  the  1999 revision tried to  treat  the
individual and private economies on an equal footing, whereas the previous provisions
seemed to accord a different degree of state control over them53.
17 Because  of  the  specific  meaning  of  the  individual  and  private  economies  and  the
continuing flourishing of the private sectors in different business forms and structures,
such  as  sole  proprietorship  and  partnerships,  there  is  a  clear  need  to  accord
constitutional  protection  to  these  new  forms  of  the  private  economy,  hence  the
insertion of the phrase “other non-public economy” into Article 11 through the present
revision. Though the phrase is an ambiguous one, it is meant to embrace the various
existing  and  emerging  forms  of  private  business,  including  foreign  investment  in
China. In addition to providing protection, the revision further adds that the state will
also  provide  encouragement  and  support  to  the  development  of  the  non-public
economy. By doing so, the private sectors final achieve equal status with their public
counterparts  in  most  economic  activities54.The  controversial  part  of  the  revision
concerns the revision of Article 13. Article 13 does provide protection to lawful income,
houses and other private property and the right to inheritance. There has long been
uncertainty about Article 13.  First,  the listing of lawful income, wages,  houses,  etc.,
came from the socialist distinction of means of production and means for livelihood55,
with only the latter being allowed to be owned privately. Secondly, public property is
declared sacred and inviolable by the Constitution (Article 12),  while the state only
offers  protection  for  limited  private  property.  This  implicitly  indicates  a  different
degree  of  protection  to  the  two  types  of  property.  Further,  Article  13  refers  to
ownership rights to property (suoyouquan) instead of the more universally understood
term of property rights (caichanquan). The revision thus intends to do away with one of
the last remnants of the influence of Soviet law.
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18 While private property is not deemed sacred, as is public property, it is now declared
inviolable.  Further,  if  private  property  is  expropriated or  taken over  for  state  use,
compensation must be paid by the state under the revised Constitution. Similarly, as
land-use rights have been commercialised, compensation for expropriation or taking
over for use by the state is also guaranteed by the revised Constitution56, As such one
can say quite comfortably that for most practical  purposes equal protection is  now
provided for both public and private property. This should now clear away one of the
most  difficult  aspects  of  enacting  a  civil  code  in  China:  how  to  deal  with  the
differentiated  treatment  of  public  and  private  property  under  a  unified  notion  of
property rights57. 
 
There is now better protection for private propriety
© Imaginechina
19 As mentioned earlier, this revision has been controversial. However, the controversy is
not  about  the  protection  for  private  property  per  se,  it  is  the  concern  about  the
legalisation of illegally acquired property, such as that acquired through corruption,
the embezzlement of public property by various means, and other illegal means. Thus,
the use of the adjective “lawful” in front of private property is not redundant; it is used
to address the fear that illegally acquired property might become untouchable.
20 Being  a  socialist  country  and  having  provided  constitutional  protection  to  private
property, China faces an obvious question, that of social justice, or the establishment of
a minimum social safety net in the face of the increasingly widening gap between the
rich and poor.  This  the Chinese government in fact  began to address several  years
ago58.  The present revision now makes it  a  constitutional  obligation of  the state to
establish  a  social  security  system  appropriate  to  the  level  of  national  economic
development59. Once again, it is a positive development that should provide the poor
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with  a  constitutional  claim,  at  least  theoretically,  or  a  moral  claim,  against  the
government should the government fail to deliver a minimum social safety net. 
A civilian approach to a state of emergency
21 The original Constitution provided the Standing Committee of the NPC with the power
to declare the imposition of martial law (jieyan) (to be proclaimed by the President of
the PRC) throughout the country or in particular provinces, autonomous regions or
municipalities directly under the Central Government, and gave the State Council the
power  to  impose  the  order  in  parts  of  provinces,  autonomous  regions  and
municipalities directly under the Central Government60. This the State Council did in
Tibet and in Peking in 1989. However, the circumstances under which martial law may
be declared are only vaguely defined by Article 2 of the Martial Law of the PRC61, which
provides  for  the imposition of  martial  law in a  state  of  emergency in which social
turmoil  (dongluan),  a  violent  upheaval  (baoluan)  or  serious  disturbance  (yanzhong
saoluan)  is  occurring and where extraordinary measures must be taken to maintain
social  order  and  protect  life  and  property.  Under  this  definition  and  through  the
experiences in Tibet and Peking in 1989, martial law is widely perceived as immediately
and directly invoking a military-style solution to civilian unrest that might not warrant
any violent  solution,  thus  causing  the  unnecessary  involvement  of  the  army62.  The
revision now replaces the power to order martial law with the power to declare a state
of emergency (jinji zhuangkuang). While this revision clearly widens the scope within
which restrictions may be imposed through a declaration, such as in cases of the SARS
epidemic and other natural disasters (such as floods)63, it also signals the willingness of
the state authorities to explore civilian solutions, such as the primary use of civilian
police to deal with civil unrest and other emergency situations, leaving the military
solution as the last resort. Considering the tragedies in Tibet, Peking and several other
cities in 1989, the revision is both positive and potentially life-saving. Since the Martial
Law of the PRC was enacted in 1996, the revision of the Constitution would now require
that the law be revised. Since the Constitution provides few procedures or criteria for
declaring a state of emergency, it is hoped that a new law on states of emergency will
clearly set out all these details64,  hence providing further protection to the peaceful
exercise  of  some fundamental  human rights,  such  as  the  right  to  assembly  and to
demonstration.
Other technical revisions
22 Other revisions are largely non-controversial and technical in nature. With the return
of  sovereignty over  Hong Kong and Macao to  the PRC,  the representation of  these
regions  in  the  NPC  is  now  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution65.  Heads  of  state  in  all
countries routinely conduct state affairs, such as paying or hosting state visits, so the
President  of  the  PRC,  being  the  head  of  state,  is  now provided  with  the  power  to
conduct such affairs66. Since the term of the NPC and provincial people’s congresses is
five years, it is only appropriate to grant people’s congresses at the township level the
same term of office67. By doing so, it implicitly elevates the status of people’s congresses
at the township level and, perhaps, may also afford some protection to elected people’s
representatives at this level through the extension of their tenure of office. Finally, the
national anthem, the March of the Volunteers68, has been sung by the Chinese people
ever since the founding of the PRC, and was formally declared the national anthem by
the NPC in 1982 so it is again appropriate to give it constitutional status69. Further, the
incorporation of the national anthem in the state constitution is to immortalise the
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revolutionary spirit as contained in the national anthem and, surely, makes any future
change of the national anthem difficult.
A cautious or conservative approach?
23 Other than the imposition of a Party ideology, that of the Three Represents, upon the
people70,  the  present  revision  of  the  Constitution  is  largely  positive  and  should  be
welcomed as such. Clearly, the future impact of some of the revisions is potentially far-
reaching  with  significant  practical  ramifications.  The  problem  is  therefore  not
principally  with  the  contents  of  the  revisions,  but  with  the  frequent  changes  of  a
fundamental law and the issues that are not addressed.
24 True, the Constitution is conceived of as a document that affirms the achievements of
the  struggles  of  the  Chinese  people  and  is  intended  only  to  contain  the  “very
fundamental and necessary” provisions that can be decided at the present time71. It is
also a document that defines the basic system and basic tasks of the nation in a legal
form.  It  is  a  set  of  general  rules  and serves  the  state  as  a  fundamental  charter  of
organisation72.  As such a political document, one would expect it to be revised from
time to time in accordance with the perception of the current leadership of the CPC
about the present and the future73. However, a revision of the fundamental charter of a
nation every five years is, by any criteria, far too frequent, and likely to undermine,
rather than to enhance, the authority of the Constitution.
25 On the other hand, the present Constitution is not one that is already “perfect” and
needing no further revision. Indeed, it is a document riddled with many fundamental
flaws. The problem with the current revision is, therefore, not what has been revised,
but what has not been addressed. Thus the question is,  what are the problems that
require  urgent  action.  The  list  would  be  very  long74,  however,  chief  among  these
problems are the lack of implementation procedures and a meaningful mechanism of
checks and balances. The former may be achieved through other basic laws but the
latter has to be dealt with in the Constitution75.
26 There  are  also some very  pressing  practical  reasons  that  the  Constitution  requires
more extensive, if  not fundamental,  reforms. In a widely publicised case, now often
referred to as the “Seeds Case”, a judge in a local court (Luoyang Intermediate Court in
Henan Province) invalidated a local regulation on the basis of its being in conflict with
the national Seeds Law. This decision quickly attracted intervention from the Standing
Committee of the Henan People’s Congress. The intervention was extraordinary in that
the  Standing  Committee  demanded  the  rectification  of  the  decision  and  severe
punishment  of  the  judges  even  before  an  appeal  had  been  dealt  with  by  a  higher
court76. This simple contractual dispute and especially the subsequent intervention by
the local legislature reveals a great deal (though not all) of the systemic problems in
the  Chinese  legal  system  concerning  implementation  of  law:  the  existence  of  a
hierarchy  of  law  but  the  almost  total  absence  of  mechanisms  and  procedures  for
dealing  with  conflict  of  laws  in  the  hierarchy,  the  ambiguous  constitutional  and
institutional  division  of  powers,  the  tension  between  judicial  independence  and
accountability, the focus on substantive justice at the price of due process, the conflict
of local and national interests, and, of course, the constant power struggles between
and among institutions and personnel. Added to these problems, though not related to
the  present  case,  are  the  widely  reported  judicial  corruption  and  incompetence,
sensitivity to suggestions for political reform, and the all-powerful yet often invisible
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Party and government intervention in judicial activities. Clearly, some of these issues
need to be addressed through the Constitution.
27 In another case,  which is widely reported as the first instance where constitutional
rights were directly enforced by a court, in mid-2001 the Supreme People’s Court gave a
clear and positive reply in relation to a request from Shandong High Court concerning
whether  the  right  to  education  as  contained  in  the  Constitution  could  be  directly
enforced and, if so, used as a legal basis for damages77.  While this is a very positive
development in constitutional law in China, the case raised many practical questions
regarding whether the Supreme People’s Court has a proper constitutional power to
undertake such implementation through interpretation and, if so, whether there are
procedures that the Court must follow78.
28 Finally, after some twenty years of promulgation of the Constitution, the knowledge of
the  Constitution  among  the  Chinese  people,  as  least  in  terms  of  knowing  of  its
existence,  is  high  and  their  expectation  of  the  actual  implementation  of  the
constitution must not be disregarded in constitutional reforms. In a survey conducted
by a group of Suzhou University scholars79,  it was revealed that 96.9% of the people
surveyed knew the existence of the Constitution, 66.14% of the people believed that a
constitution was to impose constraints on government and to provide protection for
the rights of citizens, 66.53% of people believed that the main cause for corruption was
the  lack  of  checks  and  balances;  and  53.65%  of  them  did  not  believe  that  the
Constitution had any major real effect. In this context, the several appeals made by
prominent scholars to the Standing Committee for constitutional review in relation to
some controversial cases perhaps represent more than an elitist attempt to achieve
political  reform80,  and  show  that  the  true  aspiration  of  the  people  is  for  the
Constitution to have some real effect on their lives.
29 The minimalist approach to the revisions of the Constitution, not just the present but
also the earlier revisions in 1988, 1993 and 1999, may reflect a cautious attitude towards
changes in the Constitution, since such caution has been rightly called for by some
jurists  in China81.  On the other hand,  an approach which is  minimalist,  yet  applied
frequently, may in truth represent a conservative attitude towards, or simply a lack of
confidence and courage in undertaking, any fundamental political and constitutional
reform. However, Party leadership and state authorities are no longer the only driving
forces  for  reform  in  contemporary  China;  ordinary  people82 and,  especially,
intellectuals83 are  important  and  active  agents  that  often  push  the  constitutional
parameters for further political, legal and economic reforms. In this context, there are
reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the future of rule of law and constitutionalism
in China.
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NOTES
1. It should be pointed out that, while much attention has been focused on the revision
of the state Constitution by the NPC, the Constitution of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which was holding its parallel meeting at
approximately the same time, was also revised along similar lines. The Amendments to
the Constitution of the CPPCC were adopted at its closing session on March 12th 2004,
with 1,839 votes in favour, 52 against and 113 abstentions. See Xinhua website, March
12th 2004.
2. See Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) editorial, March 15th 2004.
3. Each revision coincides with the completion of the five-year term of the Party
Congress (1982-1987, 1987-1992, 1992-1997, 1997-2002, 2002-2007) and the beginning of
a new five-year term of the National People’s Congress (1983-1988, 1988-1993,
1993-1998, 1998-2003, 2003-2008). 
4. See Jiang Bikun, et al. (ed.), Xianfa xue (Constitutional Law), Peking, Zhongguo
zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 1993, p. 5.
5. The Constitutional Amendment Bill of the PRC was adopted on March 14th 2004 with
2,863 votes in favour, 10 against and 17 abstentions and was immediately promulgated
by the NPC. The amendments and the revised Constitution was published in all major
newspapers in China on March 15th 2004.
6. See Jianfu Chen, “The Revision of the Constitution in the PRC—Conceptual Evolution
of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’”, China Perspectives, No. 24, July-August 1999,
pp. 66-79.
7. Ibid.
8. The “Four Fundamental Principles” are vaguely stated in para. 7 of the Preamble of
the 1982 Constitution which provides that “The Chinese people of all nationalities will
continue to be led by the Communist Party of China, guided by Marxism-Leninism and
Mao Zedong Thought, adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship and follow the
socialist road”.
9. Pu Zengyuan, “The Movement for Constitutionalism and Constitutions in Twentieth-
Century China”, in Alice E-S. Tay and Conita Leung (eds.), Constitution-making and
Restructuring in the Present and Former Communist World, special issue of the Bulletin of
Australian Society of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 17, Nos. 58/59, 1992, p. 162, p. 169. See also
Jiang Bikun, Xianfa xue, op. cit., pp. 3-4; and Zhang Youyu, “Jiaqiang xianfa lilun yanjiu”
(Strengthening the Research on Constitutional Theories), in Zhongguo faxue hui (Chinese
Society of Legal Science) (ed), Xianfa lunwen xuan (A Selection of Papers on the
Constitution), Peking, Qunzhong chubanshe, 1983, p. 2.
10. Thus, according to Chinese scholars, Party policy is translated, through legal
procedure, into state will. See Liu Zheng, “Wei jianshe you Zhongguo tese de
shehuizhuyi tigong youli de xianfa baozhang” (Further Constitutional Protection for
the Construction of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics), Zhongguo faxue (Legal
Science in China), No. 2, 1993, p. 6. A full text of these “suggestions” can be found in 
Fazhi ribao (Legal Daily), February 16th 1993, p. 1. The Constitutional Amendment was
adopted by the First Session of the Eighth NPC on March 29th 1993.
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11. See “Guangyu Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng an de shuoming”
(Explanations on the Constitutional Amendment Bill), presented to the Ninth NPC by
Tian Jiyun on March 9th 1999, in Renmin ribao, March 9th 1999, p. 1.
12. See Political Report on the Fifteenth Party Congress, delivered by Jiang Zemin on
September 12th 1997. An English translation of the Report appears in http://
www.chinadaily.net/cndy/history/15/fulltext.html. 
13. The Proposal was published in full in the Renmin ribao, January 31st 1999, p. 1.
14. Although there were 21 votes against the adoption and 24 abstentions, there were
no dissenting views published in the media in China.
15. One amendment does not sit well with the above categories; that is, the
replacement of the term “counter-revolutionary activities” with the term “criminal
activities jeopardising the state security” in Article 28—a change that occurred earlier
in 1997 when the Criminal Law of the PRC was comprehensively revised. For a detailed
discussion of the 1999 constitutional revision, see Jianfu Chen, op. cit.
16. Jiang passed his positions as Party Secretary-General and the President of the State
to Hu Jintao in 2002 (at the Party Congress) and 2003 (at the NPC) respectively.
However, Jiang continues to hold the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission.
17. See “Explanation on the Draft Bill of the Constitutional Amendments”, presented to
the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress by Wang Zhaoguo,
March 8th 2004. The full text was published in the Renmin ribao, March 8th 2004, http://
www.peopledaily.com.cn. 
18. Ibid.
19. Renmin ribao, August 12th 2003, p. 1.
20. Ibid.
21. Thus, the Caijing Weekly (www.Caijing.com.cn) reported, on June 20th 2003, a
meeting between Wu Bangguo as head of the Constitutional Group with several
prominent Chinese economists and jurists, at which he solicited opinions from these
scholars on the pending constitutional revision. Agence France Presse, based on a 
Caijing Weekly report, then reported, on June 23rd 2003, the “secret” establishment of a
constitutional revision group.
22. For an excellent overview of academic studies on constitutional revision that have
emerged since 2001, see Zeng Ping, “Xianfa xiugai wenti yanjiu zongshu” (A Summary
of Research on Issues Relating to Constitutional Revision), in Renmin ribao website, 
http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/14576/14841/2084188.htm. 
23. A detailed summary of views expressed at the Qingdao conference is available from 
www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=2550. 
24. A detailed summary of views expressed at Shanghai conference is available from 
www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=2368. 
25. See John Pomfret, “China Orders Halt to Debate on Reforms”, Washington Post,
August 27th 2003, p. 01. Although rumours had it that there was a written document to
the effect that further debate on constitutional and political reform was banned,
interviews with Chinese scholars seem to suggest that only an oral instruction (da
zhaohu) was circulated to this effect. Since academic papers continued to appear in
journals and newspapers and on websites, it seems that it is more likely that the
instruction was in an oral form with limited effect.
26. See “Explanation on the Draft Bill of the Constitutional Amendments”, op. cit.
27. Ibid.
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28. For a detailed discussion on the evolution of the guiding constitutional principles,
including the introduction of the Four Fundamental Principles and Deng Xiaoping
Theory, see Jianfu Chen, op. cit.
29. Interestingly, the most comprehensive statement on the Three Represents is
contained in the much anticipated and widely publicised first major speech by the new
Party Secretary-General, Hu Jintao on commemorating the 82nd anniversary of the
founding of the CPC on July 1st 2003. The full speech was published in the Renmin ribao,
July 2nd 2003.
30. The phrase was earlier added to Article 5 of the Constitution in 1999. See Jianfu
Chen, op. cit. 
31. An English version of the Party Constitution is available in the China Daily,
December 6th 2002. A Chinese text of the Party Constitution is available in the Renmin
ribao, November 19th 2002. This English translation has been modified according to the
original Chinese texts.
32. See paragraph 13 of the revised Party Constitution.
33. Now sometimes called the “Five Fundamental Principles”. See Jianfu Chen, op. cit..
34. See paragraph 1 of the revised Party Constitution.
35. He Weifang, “Zhongguo fazhi jianshe de kunjing yu chulu” (Difficulties in
Establishing Rule of Law and Solutions), published in http://www.law-thinker.com/
details.asp?id=476
36. Here I am not endorsing the practice of imposing a Party ideology upon the will of
the people, however well the ideology is formulated. It certainly has little foundation in
asserting that it is the desire or the aspiration of the people to incorporate the “Three
Represents” in the Constitution, as some deputies to the NPC would like us to believe.
37. See amendment to paragraph 10 of the Preamble.
38. See Jianfu Chen, From Administrative Authorisation to Private Law, Bordrecht, Boston,
London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, Ch. 3.
39. It is a quiet change as it has attracted little discussion in the Chinese media. Indeed,
the “Explanation on the Draft Bill of the Constitutional Amendments” (op. cit.) does not
explain the reasons for the change at all.
40. A new insert in Article 33 of the Constitution.
41. See Ronald C. Keith, China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law, New York, St. Martin’s Press,
1994, pp. 66-67; “Recent Human Rights Studies in the PRC”, being Annex II to the Report
of the Second Australian Human Rights Delegation to China 8-20 November 1992, Canberra,
AGPS, 1993, pp. 99-100. See further discussions in Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an
Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development, The Hague, London, Boston,
Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 90-93.
42. See Keith, op. cit., pp. 66-72. The white paper was published in several languages. For
an English version, see Beijing Review, November 4th-10th, 1991.
43. China signed the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights on October 5th
1998, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on
October 27th 1997, with the latter having already been ratified by the Standing
Committee of the NPC on February 28th 2001 and the likelihood of ratification of the
former in the future.
44. See Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and
Development, op. cit., p. 93.
45. Zhang Youyu, “Strengthening the Research on Constitutional theories”, in Chinese
Society of Legal Science, op. cit, pp. 8-9; Gu Angran, Shehui zhuyi fazhi jianshe he lifa
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gongzuo (The Construction of a Socialist Legal System and Legislative Work), Peking,
Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 1989, pp. 92-93; Sun Yamin, “Shehui zhuyi minzhu
yu fazhi de xin fazhan” (The New Developments in Socialist Democracy and Socialist
Legality), in Zhang Youyu (ed.), Xianfa lunwen ji (A Collection of Papers on the
Constitution) (Supplementary Volume), Peking, Qunzhong chubanshe, 1982, p. 19; and
Wu Jie and Xu Xiuyi, “Lun falu mianqian renren pingdeng yuanze” (On the Principle of
Equality before the Law), in Chinese Society of Legal Science, op. cit., pp. 134-141.
46. For further discussion on the changes of wording in relation to equality before the
law under the various Chinese constitutions, see Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an
Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development, op. cit., p.92.
47. For instance, on the commemorating of the twentieth anniversary of the
promulgation of the Constitution on December 4th 2002, Hu Jintao emphasised that
“[I]t is desirable to promote the Constitution extensively in society so that it is known
to every household and penetrates to the people’s heart, which will lead the broad
masses of people to the notion that the Constitution is not only a norm every citizen
should observe in behaviour, but also a legal weapon with which they can safeguard
their citizens’ rights.” An English translation of his speech is available from 2 (3) 2003 
Human Rights, pp. 1-5. (Human Rights is published by the China Society for Human Rights
Studies, Peking).
48. “Top legislators consider amending constitution again”, id. In mid-March 2004, for
the first time, Chinese media reported that some 10,000 people were sentenced to
immediate execution each year, not including people sentenced to death with a two-
year suspension. See “41 deputies suggested that the Supreme People’s Court should re-
centralise the approval power over the death penalty”, originally published in the 
Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), and re-published in the Renmin ribao, March
16th 2004 Internet edition viewed at: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/
1060/2388561.html. In this context, any positive change in the state value system is
potentially life-saving.
49. Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and
Development, op. cit., pp. 290-291.
50. Article 2 of the Provisional Regulations of the PRC on Private Enterprises (1988). See
further discussions in Jianfu Chen, ibid., pp. 291-292.
51. By early 1999, it accounted for 15% of GDP. See “Constitutional Amendments Propel
China’s Reform and Opening-up”, China Daily, March 17th 1999. By November 2003,
there were some 2.97 million registered private businesses with a registered capital of
more than US$40 billion, and contributing half of China’s economic growth. See
“Private firms need support, understanding”, China Daily, Internet edition, March 10th
2004, www.chinadaily.com.cn. 
52. See 1999 amendment to Article 11.
53. As can be seen in the Appendix to this paper (the Comparative Table of
Constitutional Amendments), disparities existed in the wording on the protection and
control of the individual and private economies prior to the 1999 revision. The
distinction of the two sectors, depending on whether private employment involves
eight or more people, is artificial and arbitrary. Such a distinction is increasingly
blurred in practice. See Jianfu Chen, From Administrative Authorisation to Private Law: A
Comparative Perspective of the Developing Civil Law in the PRC, Dordrecht, Boston, London,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, pp. 113-116.
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54. Article 7 of the Constitution still states that “[T]he state-owned economy, i.e., the
sector of the socialist economy under the ownership of the whole people is the leading
force in the national economy. The state ensures the consolidation and growth of the
state-owned economy”. And indeed, in some important economic activities, such as
obtaining bank loans, the state sectors continue to have priority.
55. For socialist conceptions of property, see Viktor Knapp, “Socialist Countries” and
F.H. Lawson, “Comparative Conclusions” in Int’l.Enc.Comp.L., Vol. vi (Property and
Trust), Ch. 2 (Structural Variations in Property Law), S.3 and S.8 respectively; John N.
Hazard, Communists and Their Law: A Search for the Common Core of the Legal
Systems of the Marxian Socialist States, Chicago, London, The University of Chicago
Press, 1969, chapters 8 and 9; and Jianfu Chen, From Administrative Authorisation to
Private Law: A Comparative Perspective of the Developing Civil Law in the PRC, op. cit., pp.
144-149. See also “Explanation on the Draft Bill of the Constitutional Amendments”, op.
cit., p. 18.
56. See revised Article 10 of the Constitution.
57. See Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and
Development, op. cit., Chapter 5.
58. In the last ten years or so, China has gradually established a social security
structure, composed of retirement insurance, medical insurance, unemployment
insurance, insurance for work-related injuries, and birth insurance, and covering a
total population of some 100 million people. However, other than rudimentary medical,
poverty and old pension insurance for rural populations in coastal regions, the social
security system is yet to reach the rural population. See Press Conference given by the
Minister for Labour and Social Security, March 11th 2004, Xinhuanet: 
www.xinhuanet.com/zhibo/20040309b/wz.htm. 
59. See revised Article 14 of the Constitution.
60. See Article 67 (20), 80, and 89 (16) of the Constitution before the present revision. 
61. Adopted by the Standing Committee of the NPC on March 1st 1996 and effective on
the same date.
62. Under Article 8 of the Martial Law of the PRC (1996), martial law is to be enforced
by police and armed police and, if necessary, the army may be called in to assist in its
enforcement. Thus, martial law is not necessarily enforced by the army, but the
experiences of 1989 have been to the contrary and thus left people with the impression
that an order for martial law would inevitably be enforced by the army. See also
“Constitutional amendment paves way for drafting emergency law”, in http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-01/06/content_1333061.htm. 
63. The SARS epidemic and other natural disasters are examples given by Wang in his
explanation of the need for the revision so as to expand the scope that would be
covered by the Constitution and the law. See “Explanation on the Draft Bill of the
Constitutional Amendments”, op. cit.
64. Other than the above “definition” of circumstances for which martial law may be
imposed, the 1996 Martial Law only codifies the constitutional provisions without
elaborating either the procedures or the criteria. A law on state emergencies is
currently listed among the 76 laws that will be drafted during the Tenth NPC’s five year
term. See the Five-Year Legislative Plan, available at the Renmin ribao website: 
www.peopledaily.com.cn. 
65. See revised Article 59 of the Constitution.
66. See revised Article 81 of the Constitution.
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67. See revised Article 98 of the Constitution.
68. The lyrics of the March of the Volunteers were written by the well-known poet Tian
Han and the music composed by the well-loved composer Nie Er in 1935, in honour of
those fighting the Japanese invasion in the 1930s. It was initially adopted by the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), in September 1949 as an
interim national anthem. Tian Han was, however, denounced as a traitor during the
Cultural Revolution, and for many years the March of the Volunteers was played as a
national anthem without words. It was not until December 1982 that the NPC officially
proclaimed it the national anthem. 
69. See revised title of Chapter 4 and Article 136 of the Constitution.
70. Interestingly, two prominent professors invited to offer their opinions by the
Constitutional Revision Group, Professors Jiang Ping and Wu Jinlian, unambiguously
opposed the direct incorporation of the Three Represents, though they agreed that the
“spirit” of the new thinking would be appropriate for incorporation in the amendment.
See “Jiang Ping jiaoshou zai zhonggong zhongyang xiuxian xiaozu zhuanjiao zuotanhui
de fayan” (Speech by Jiang Ping at the Expert Seminar Organised by the Constitutional
Revision Group of the Central Committee of the CPC), and “Wu Jinlian jiaoshou zai
zhonggong zhongyang xiuxian xiaozu zhuanjiao zuotanhui de fayan” (Speech by Wu
Jinlian at the Expert Seminar Organised by the Constitutional Revision Group of the
Central Committee of the CPC), in www.law-thinker.com.
71. See the Preamble of the Constitution of the PRC (1982). See also Gu Angran, Shehui
zhuyi fazhi jianshi he lifa gongzuo, op. cit., p. 57; and Zhang Youyu, “Renzhen shiji de
taolun” (To Discuss Seriously and Practically), in Zhang Youyu, Xianfa lunwen ji, op. cit.,
p. 5.
72. In 1954 when the first constitution of the PRC was adopted, Mao Zedong declared
that “An organisation must have rules, and a state also must have rules; the
Constitution is a set of general rules and is a fundamental charter [of the state]”. See
Chang Chun-chiao (one of the Gang of Four), “Report on the Revision of the
Constitution (delivered at the First Session of the Fourth National Peoples Congress,
1975)”, in Joseph En-pao Wang (ed.), Selected Legal Documents of the PRC, University
Publications of America, 1976, p. 93. Despite the official repudiation of the Cultural
Revolution and part of Mao Zedong Thought, Mao’s idea of the constitution is still
followed by the contemporary leadership and law-makers in the PRC. See Gu Angran, 
Shehui zhuyi fazhi jianshi he lifa gongzuo, op. cit., p. 50.
73. The Chinese leadership has never denied the fact that the Party has a heavy-handed
involvement and exercises strong control over the making and revision of constitutions
of the PRC. See Gu Angran, ibid., pp. 53-60. Even though Article 64 of the 1982
Constitution requires that “amendments to the Constitution are to be proposed by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress or by more than one-fifth of the
deputies to the NPC and adopted by a majority vote of more than two-thirds of all the
deputies to the Congress”, all recent amendments to the Constitution were initiated
and drafted by the Party despite recent calls for the separation of the Party and the
state. Indeed, it is now suggested that one of the unwritten constitutional conventions
(guanli) in China is that major issues concerning the state, such as the revision of the
Constitution, are to be initiated by the Party, though nominally decided by the
Legislature. See Jiang Bikun, op. cit., p. 38.
74. Indeed, Chinese scholars have identified many constitutional issues that need
urgent solution if the Constitution is to be effective in fulfilling its intended functions.
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See views expressed at Qingdao and Shanghai seminars on constitutional reform, supra
notes 23 and 24; Zeng Ping, op. cit. See also special collections of articles on
constitutional revision: Zhengfa luntan (Journal of the China University of Political
Science and Law), No. 2, 2003; Zhengzhi yu falü (Political Science and Law), No. 3, 2003; 
Zhongguo faxue (China Legal Science), No. 3, 2003; and Zhongwai faxue (Peking University
Law Journal), No. 5, 2003.
75. In a recent Internet survey conducted by the Xinhua News Agency, anti-corruption
was the top concern among the people participating in the web survey conducted
before and during the Second Session of the Tenth NPC. See www.xinhuanet.com. A
year ago, the People’s Daily conducted a similar survey, which received responses from
more than 200,000 people, and indicated that anti-corruption and the establishment of
checks and balances were nominated as the top issue that people expected the Tenth
National People’s Congress (NPC) (2003-8) to address. See “Top ten issues selected by
netizens for the NPC to address”, Renmin ribao, Internet edition, February 26th 2003.
Also according to Xinhua, as of October 2003 there were no fewer than 4,000 corrupt
officials who had fled China, with more than US$5 billion having been stolen by them
and transferred overseas and, in the last three years alone, no less than US$53 billion
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